Abstract:
Contemporary deterrence scholarship remains disproportionately focused on military instruments, often neglecting the strategic utility of diplomacy, information, and economic statecraft. Our study addresses this imbalance through a new methodology for analysing how authoritarian states respond to the range of foreign policy tools: diplomatic, information, military, and economic (the DIME framework). Using a state’s propaganda, official statements, and media (POSM) to capture target states’ reactions to adversarial DIME actions, we offer an innovative analytical framework that enhances understanding of deterrence dynamics beyond the military sphere. Within the framework, we use computational text analysis, statistical analysis, and data visualisation to create a replicable process for analysing POSM big data. Applying this methodology to a case study of China, we find that Beijing’s POSM-based responses to information tools – such as public criticism of censorship and information control by NGOs – are more negative than to diplomatic, military, or economic tools. Our methodology contributes to deterrence theory and policy through its insight into non-military effects and by offering a scalable process for empirical analysis ripe for AI implementation. For policymakers, our process and findings hold implications for crafting more effective and sustainable deterrence strategies in an increasingly complex international security environment.
The full article, available as open access courtesy of Leiden University, is available on Cambridge.